The political right is streets ahead of the left in calculating that the great issue of our time is Canadian sovereignty. For the right, the issue is pitched as "North American integration", which they fervently embrace. The right has thought through the issue, has an agenda, and is proceeding to realize it. Right-wing think tanks and the political hard right have mapped out the route to a much deeper integration of Canada with the United States. Their audacious, if unstated, goal is to extinguish what remains of Canadian sovereignty.
For decades, the C.D. Howe Institute has been devoted to fostering an ever closer relationship between Canada and the United States. The Institute was publishing papers advocating a free trade deal between Ottawa and Washington more than a decade before the Mulroney government made this a live political issue. Following the September 11 terror attacks, the Institute began publishing "The Border Papers", described as "a project on Canada’s choices regarding North American Integration." The Border Papers have been published with the financial backing of the Donner Canadian Foundation, also a well-known supporter of continentalist causes.
In April 2002, Wendy Dobson, Director of the Institute of International Business and Professor at the Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, authored the first Border Paper, which argued that Canada ought to take the radical step of initiating a scheme of deep North American integration. Dobson proposed what she called a "Big Idea", "one that addresses U.S. objectives while creating new economic opportunities for Canada". To interest the Americans in such a proposition, Canada would be required to propose steps that Washington would find attractive in the following areas: border security, immigration, defence, and energy security.
Dobson’s critique of Canada’s situation was that while the country had benefited historically from steps toward international economic openness, it had fallen significantly behind the U.S. in productivity and standard of living during the 1990s following the implementation of NAFTA. One might have thought that the fact that Canada had suffered during the new age of free trade, would be a reason for rethinking whether continentalism was the way to go for the future. Dobson reaches exactly the opposite conclusion. Only deeper integration with the U.S. can solve the problems created by the current level of integration, she insists.
This paradoxical reasoning shows up in virtually all continentalist writings. So sure are the proponents of integration with the U.S. about the soundness of their position that any difficulties that have arisen so far are written off as evidence that the process has not gone far enough. If the patient seems to be suffering from the medicine being taken, the solution is to increase the dose.
Well aware that Canadians are highly sensitive about the preservation of their national sovereignty, Dobson tried to square the circle by dressing up her proposal for deep integration as a creative example of the exercise of sovereignty. "The traditional definition of sovereignty refers to a country’s determination of key policies and national control of decisions affecting its governance," she writes. From this unobjectionable statement, she proceeds to the brave new world of the twenty-first century. "Thus, a common theme in the international debate about economic integration---that it erodes national sovereignty and causes the nation-state to wither away---needs to be put in a different perspective. States are the architects of their own constraints through the decisions they make, such as supporting international regimes that make them more accountable to other public and private sector participants, and through the decisions they avoid by failing to exercise their sovereignty." In this wonderland, when a country like Canada bargains away its sovereignty in binding arrangements with a superpower, this can be redefined as a brilliant exercise of sovereignty.
Dobson wants to be able to claim that at the end of the deep integration she proposes, Canada will still enjoy what she calls "political independence", although exactly what Canadians will be allowed to do with it she doesn’t say. Beyond issuing stamps and flying the maple leaf flag, though, it’s not clear what powers this politically independent Canada would actually exercise.
A couple of months after Dobson’s Big Idea, historian Jack Granatstein produced a Border Paper on Canada’s future military options. Granatstein, a Distinguished Research Professor of History Emeritus at York University and Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, made the argument for a new and deeper military alliance with the United States. Much as Dobson argues, Canadians must make a virtue of necessity, Granatstein says, by going along with the U.S. on all key security and defence questions.
Granatstein’s argument is that in the wake of September 11, the United States is determined to defend itself, with or without the cooperation of Canada. Therefore, "there is no choice at all: Canada must cooperate with the United States in its own interest." Dismissive of what he calls the Canadian penchant for "poking the Americans with the sharp stick of supposedly superior Canadian morality", he is sympathetic to the U.S. view of things. "The superpower neighbour," Granatstein writes "has global responsibilities and burdens, and it often tires of Canadian caution, endless remonstrances, and prickly independence when what it wants and needs is support."
Granatstein paints a picture of the new world in which we live. "Fueled by militant Islam, terrorism has suddenly become the major threat to secular, democratic, and pluralist states," he writes. Faced with this threat, the United States has been building its coalition to strike at "terrorist bases and their supporters in Afghanistan and pledged war against all who shelter terrorists." In addition, the United States is acting to "bolster its homeland security…and is pressing Canada to join more effectively in the defence of North America. Washington is also demanding that the hitherto porous Canada-U.S. border be secured and that Canada’s lax refugee and immigrant screening procedures be tightened."
While the United States has been gearing up for these tasks, and for the development of a ballistic missile defence system as well, Canada has been allowing its armed forces to wither, Granatstein argues. "Canada’s defence spending of U.S.$265 per capita is less than half the NATO average of U.S.$589, and its 1.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) devoted to defence is precisely half the NATO average," writes Granatstein. The consequence, he states is that "the Canadian Forces have all but lost the capacity to undertake operations for a sustained period."
Granatstein insists that Canada must align itself with the Bush administration on crucial defence and security issues. A key strategic question is Canada’s position on the Bush administration’s highly controversial plan to develop a National Missile Defence system. For Granatstein it is a choice between "high morality" and "great practicality", really no choice at all. Since the U.S. would likely want to put a workable NMD system----should one ever be developed---under NORAD, Canada’s opposition to the system could dismantle NORAD as an effective integrated command system. "On the other hand," Granatstein writes "if Canada accepted NMD and missile defence went to NORAD, Canada’s influence might actually increase."
This advice means that even if the Canadian government believes, along with many Europeans, the Russians and the Chinese, that Bush’s NMD plan could push the world into a dangerous new arms race which would have negative consequences for Canadians, Ottawa ought to forget about this. Granatstein believes that signing on to NMD might give Canadians increased influence. Exactly, what sort of influence? Granatstein immediately qualifies his answer: "No one suggests that Canada would acquire "go/no go" authority over NMD if NORAD runs the show. But Canada would have the right to consultation, the right to participation, and the right to a place at the table when decisions are made."
With the weasel words in this passage, Granatstein comes close to admitting what ought to be obvious. In a real crisis, the decision to act or not to act would be taken in Washington. Canadians would be bystanders, the only difference being that they would be at the table. Indeed, Granatstein’s history recital reveals the truth in this. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, U.S. commanders put Canadian forces on full alert without the Diefenbaker government signing off on this. On this grave breach of Canadian sovereignty, Granatstein is frank: "Without waiting for Cabinet approval, belatedly and grudgingly granted, the RCN put to sea to shadow Soviet submarines in the Atlantic, and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) went on alert, ready to counter any attack by Soviet bombers." Granatstein calls this "the single greatest breach of proper civil-military relations in Canadian history." Nevertheless, he proposes that we set ourselves up for just such a situation at a moment of international crisis in the future.
Not surprisingly, Granatstein wants Canada to attempt to expand the responsibilities of NORAD to cover much of the ground for which the Bush administration has established the new "America’s Command". He says, quite rightly, that it is "very unlikely that Canada will be invited to participate" in the planning or command structure of NORTHCOM, the new United States integrated command for homeland defence. NORTHCOM will operate next door to NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado and will be led by the same U.S. four star general who heads NORAD.
The problem with an expanded NORAD is that Canadians could end up with most of their armed forces----army, navy and air force----under the command of a U.S. general. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has raised concerns about the implications of putting Canadians under U.S. command. "What does a Canadian soldier do," he queries "if asked to handle land mines on Canadian soil, in contravention of our treaty undertakings? What if we apprehend someone considered a war criminal…? U.S. law would prevent them being turned over to the [International Criminal Court], while our obligations require it." Axworthy has also pointed to the problem of putting our Armed Forces under U.S. command because it would mean that Canada could not exercise authority in the Arctic, where Canada has serious sovereignty disagreements with the U.S. over Arctic waters.
Then, for good measure, Granatstein raises the question of a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq. Here again, he brushes aside possible Canadian objections to an invasion as though they are just so much moral fluff. "Canadian officials," he writes "tend to argue that, if Iraq is clearly linked to September 11, then war is defensible, but otherwise, it is not….We know that Iraq supports terrorists, though possibly not including Al Qaeda…"
"So what should Canada say when the United States asks for Ottawa’s support….? Anti-Americans have their answer ready: U.S. wars of aggression are no more moral than Iraqi ones, and we have no proof that Iraq was involved in the events of September 11."
"Nevertheless, an attack against Saddam and his replacement by a leadership that is not so ruthlessly megalomaniacal would be a major gain for the war on terrorism, Iraqis, the region, and the world community. [For Canada] the price of opposition…would likely be severe…..If Canada hangs back, reinforcing the perception that Canadian anti-Americanism and high falutin’ morality too often verge on the unbearable, the costs to Ottawa might be very high indeed. To participate militarily in a war on Iraq would be a Canadian choice. To support the United States in such a war would be a Canadian requirement."
Having advised Canada to support the U.S. on National Missile Defence and an invasion of Iraq, in addition to offering to place Canadian forces under U.S. command, Granatstein regards it as essential that Ottawa increase Canada’s military spending. "Does it matter if we are freeloaders? It does, to the military, of course, but also to the nation and to the rest of the world because it indicates our lack of seriousness….
"Perhaps the reflexive anti-Americanism that characterizes so much of public debate in Canada springs from our guilty conscience. Canada is a defence freeloader, and like spongers everywhere, we dislike those who carry the burden for us."
Granatstein’s analysis leads him to the view that the best course for Canada is to do what the Americans want us to before they insist. This idea of "sovereignty" is highly reminiscent of what U.S. analysts called "Finlandization" in the 1970s. The term referred to the tendency of the government of Finland to kow tow to the wishes of the Soviet Union on key issues. The sorry plight of Finland was portrayed as a warning to the West as a whole if it failed to stand up to the Soviets. Today, it is Canada that risks Finlandization. And we are being pushed down that road by the continentalists at the C.D. Howe Institute, and the likes of Wendy Dobson and Jack Granatstein.
The political party that is most in tune with the ideas of the C.D. Howe Institute is the Canadian Alliance. In his maiden speech in the House as Leader of the Opposition on May 28, 2002, Stephen Harper made the case for an Alliance motion that charged the Liberal government with failure in its management of relations with the U.S. Harper’s thesis was that the Chretien government had been insufficiently staunch in its support for the positions adopted by the U.S. administration.
Harper charged Chretien with "open meddling in U.S. domestic politics prior to the 2000 presidential election when the Prime Minister stated his preference with regard to the outcome of that election." He quoted the comments of the former political counsellor at the U.S. embassy, David Jones, who said in January 2001 that Chretien exhibits "a tin ear for foreign affairs, especially those involving the United States." Harper’s conclusion: "It is no secret that this poisoned the relationship between the government and the new American administration." Quoting an unnamed source in the National Post to the effect that the Prime Minister is not a player with the Bush administration, Harper cites this anonymous authority as saying that "the Americans could not care less about the views of the current Prime Minister. This is particularly evident in President Bush’s passivity in dealing with the softwood lumber dispute."
Not a word of criticism in Harper’s speech is directed at Washington for its failure to seek a solution on the softwood lumber issue. All the blame is laid at Ottawa’s door. Apparently it did not occur to Harper that taking the side of the government in its tough negotiations with Washington on the issue could make it clear to the Bush administration that Canadians were united on the question. Instead, Harper made it appear that Canadians were hopelessly divided and that the Official Opposition was delighted with the anti-Canadian position of the U.S. on softwood lumber.
Harper then broadened his attack on the Chretien government, beyond trade issues, to attack it for its entire foreign policy stance vis a vis the United States. "Downright hostility to the United States, anti-Americanism, has come to characterize other dimensions of Canadian policy," he declared. "In 1996-97 Canada aggressively pushed forward with the treaty to ban landmines without giving due consideration to U.S. concerns about the potential implications for its security forces in South Korea. What did we end up with? We ended up with a ban on landmines that few major landmine producers or users have signed," Harper charged. Having dismissed an anti-landmines treaty signed by most of the nations of the world in Ottawa, Harper went on to support the Bush administration’s line on the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system. "Most recently we have been inclined to offer knee-jerk resistance to the United States on national missile defence despite the fact that Canada is confronted by the same threats from rogue nations equipped with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as is the United States." Harper’s litany of complaints against the Chretien government ended with this nod to those who allege that Canada’s refugee system makes it vulnerable to terrorists: "The government has not adequately addressed the matter of security in the context of continental security. Because of the unreformed nature of our refugee determination system, we continue to be subject to unique internal security and continental security dangers."
Harper concluded with a recitation of his principles for dealing with the United States. "Not only does the United States have this special relationship to us, it is the world leader when it comes to freedom and democracy…..If the United States prospers, we prosper. If the United States hurts or is angry, we will be hurt. If it is ever broadly attacked, we will surely be destroyed."
Here is a theory of Canadian-American relations that allows for no differentiation between the interests of the United States and those of Canada. If there are problems in the relationship, it is because Canadian leaders have been insufficiently devoted to supporting the United States on all essential matters of continental and global policy.
The Canadian Fifth Column, both its intellectual and political wings, is marching toward its goal. And even though the Alliance appears far from power at the moment, it would be a serious error to underestimate the continentalists. Even without winning office, these political forces have shown themselves highly adept at influencing, even setting, the agenda of the Liberal government over the past decade, especially on tax cuts and social program cuts. And there is a strong possibility that over the next decade, these forces will take power. One thing we have learned about the right, at both the federal and provincial levels, is that they will not moderate their program when they have the chance to implement it.
A hard right government would opt for expanding NORAD and placing Canadian forces under U.S. command. It would favour dismantling the Canada-U.S. border, adopting a continental Customs and security perimeter, and harmonizing Canadian immigration and refugee policies with those of Washington. It would be open to having Canada adopt the U.S. dollar as the country’s currency. It would dismantle medicare at the federal level and would privatize CBC television. A hard right government would enjoy the overwhelming support of big and small, foreign owned and domestically owned business in Canada. We know from experience that the blow to Canadian sovereignty that resulted from the implementation of free trade will be very difficult to reverse. The blows that would result from one term of a hard right government could be next to impossible to reverse.
Without actually being aware of it, Canadians are now confronting a grave threat to the very survival of their country. While this threat has been taking shape, the left has been sitting on its ass, amiably trying to decide if all this is something to get fussed about. In recent years, instead of confronting the reality of American imperialism directly, the Canadian left has turned the telescope around to gaze much more distantly at the problem, which it calls globalization. The demonstration in Quebec City in the spring of 2001 in opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas was a case in point. Nowhere in all that marvelous mobilization was there the slightest complaint expressed about the takeover of Canada by U.S. imperialism. Had it not been for the Quebecois who carried their own flag, the demonstration could as easily have been in Seattle or Washington as on the northern side of the border.
Over the years, we have had our feckless debates about whether Canada is a sub-imperial power, the periphery of the centre, or the centre of the periphery. The time has long passed for dialogues about how many socialists can dance on the head of a pin. We need to take up the struggle for Canadian sovereignty, to issue warnings about what could lie in store for our country, to mobilize against the threat. Squashing Canadian sovereignty would strike a catastrophic blow at working people in this country and their capacity to take control of their future.
Fortunately, beyond the confines of the scholastic left, there is a sharp rise in Canadian nationalism. Creating a broad popular democracy in Canada is inseparably linked to the struggle for Canadian sovereignty. George W. Bush’s explicit imperialist doctrine, trumpeting the right of the U.S. to dominate the world militarily and to strike pre-emptively when that is in its interest, has opened eyes everywhere, not least in Canada. As always in the past, a surfeit of American megalomania has engendered a response on this side of the border. I encounter it everywhere I go.
The place to start is by mobilizing Canadians to say that this country will have nothing to do with America’s assault on Iraq.
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